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IBSEC-CSWG-M-4
10 September 1968

COMPUTER SECURITY WORKING GROUP

OF THE

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting
Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
10 September 1968

1. The 4th meeting of the Computer Security Working Group of the USIB Security Committee was held on 10 September 1968 between 1330 and 1530 hours in Room 4 E 64, CIA Headquarters Building. In attendance were:

Members

	STAT
Mr. Richard Kitterman, State	
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Mr. Thomas Eccleston, Army	
Mr. Richard L. Welch, Navy (Alternate)	
Lt. Col. Hays Bricka, Air Force	
Lt. Col. Charles V. Burns, Air Force	
Mr. Raymond J. Brady, AEC	
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Mr. Donald R. Roderick, FBI	

Alternates, Consultants, & Observers

|	
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Lt. Col. Richard H. Koenig, Army	
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Mr. Dennis G. Lofgren, FBI	
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2. At the beginning of the meeting its security level was announced as TOP SECRET, non-codeword.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. The minutes of the 16 July 1968 meeting were approved without comment.

4. **Coordination of Working Group "Charter":** A redraft of the memorandum setting forth the proposed role of the Working Group was distributed to all attending, and time was allowed for them to read the document. The Chairman pointed out that he had prepared this redraft on the basis of comments made by members at the previous meeting as well as others submitted in writing since that meeting. He suggested that the principal task of the instant meeting was to review and accomplish final coordination on this document, so that it may be submitted to the Chairman of the Security Committee as an initial Working Group report prior to the scheduled 24 September IBSEC meeting. The memorandum requests approval of the Security Committee for the Working Group to pursue its tasks within the framework outlined in the memorandum itself. It is anticipated that this memorandum may be tabled at the 24 September IBSEC meeting.

5. Since all comments received from member agencies on the initial draft "charter" were not incorporated into the redraft, the Chairman raised for discussion all comments that he had received.

6. The Army had noted that it had no significant comments on the initial draft; the Navy had submitted its concurrence in the initial paper.

7. The Air Force had proposed that primary membership in the Working Group be accorded not only security professionals but also on a one-for-one basis representatives of the ADP technical as well as the user community. The Chairman pointed out that the need for a contribution to the Working Group effort on the part of ADP professionals (and users) is clearly recognized. However, because the Working Group is established as an arm of the Security Committee and because the problems being faced are security problems, it is felt that the Working Group should be constituted as an organization of security professionals. He noted that in the redraft he had put more emphasis on the need for technical and user input to the Working Group effort. The Air Force member concurred in the modification in this regard as reflected in paragraph 3 of the memorandum.

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8. Concerning this point Mr. Kitterman raised the question whether security representatives on the Working Group should contact appropriate ADP professionals within their organizations. The Chairman replied that in his opinion continuing contact between the security people and those responsible for ADP operations in the separate member agencies was mandatory in order to permit identification, understanding, and resolution of computer security problem areas.

9. A second comment received from the Air Force relative to the first draft was a recommendation to identify other efforts within the Government community which are designed towards goals identical with or similar to the objectives of the Working Group; the Air Force further suggested coordination with such other related efforts. This recommendation was incorporated in paragraph 5 of the redraft memorandum. In addition, the Chairman announced that a representative of one such interested effort, the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC), has been invited to attend all future Working Group meetings. Further the Chairman of the IHC will be provided copies of Working Group minutes. Similarly, the Chairman has initiated an effort to maintain liaison with the United States Communication Security Board and its efforts with reference to the TEMPEST problem in the computer environment. He also pointed out that it will be possible to maintain liaison with the Defense Science Board Computer Security Task Force.

10. A third suggestion received from the Air Force was to keep Working Group reports as much as possible in an unclassified category. The Chairman noted that whenever possible this will be done, although he feels it necessary to retain a "For Official Use Only" minimum designation for such documents. In line with the Air Force suggestion the "charter" memorandum was downgraded from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL. In the future documents prepared by the Working Group will be appropriately classified according to their content. It was agreed that minutes of Working Group meetings would bear a minimum SECRET classification and that a composite report identifying the vulnerabilities existing in the computer environment would also require a minimum SECRET classification. On the other hand, policies established at Working Group recommendation should be published at as low a classification as possible to permit broad implementation.

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11. NSA and DIA submitted comments relative to the Working Group goals set forth in the memorandum. These comments were incorporated into paragraphs 6 and 7 of the redraft and reflected a modification of previous wording emphasizing that the Working Group would <u>recommend</u> solutions to problems rather than solve them.

12. The AEC had submitted several proposals with reference to the role of the Working Group. The first recommendation was that a special committee of USIB be established to pursue the planned goals of the Working Group. It felt that such a special committee was warranted by the complexity of the problem area.

13. The Chairman suggested that this recommendation was beyond the scope of responsibility of the Working Group, since it had been established by the Chairman of the Security Committee with the charge of determining what could be done to assist that Committee in addressing the security problems in the computer environment. He indicated that to request formation of a special committee would be to admit that the problem is too large for the Security Committee to handle. He emphasized his position that the Working Group as constituted can make a definite contribution within the framework of the proposed "charter" towards recommending solutions to existing problems. For this reason the AEC suggestion was not incorporated in the redraft.

14. [   ] expressed his opinion that the establishment   STAT
of a special committee was unnecessary since such a committee could do nothing more than that envisioned for the Working Group.

15. Colonel Koenig indicated his belief that a "higher echelon" committee would have greater access to USIB itself, but emphasized that the expense and administrative organization normally inherent in the establishment of such a committee may not be the most economical way to get the exposure that the problem deserves.

16. The Chairman also asked consideration of more than just the alternatives of a special USIB committee versus an IBSEC Working Group. He noted that raising the level of the organization to that of a USIB committee still places limitation on the group's activities, since applicability of their efforts would still be within the intelligence community. Extension of the AEC proposal might well be towards the

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formation of a special computer security board, since the problems facing the intelligence community are also facing the rest of the Government. The Chairman pointed out that it would be better to initiate action within the Security Committee framework, particularly in view of the time which would be expended before the establishment of a special committee or board. He emphasized that the problems are facing the community now, require action now, and that resolution of the problems cannot wait.

17. Colonel Bricka expressed his view that a working group as envisioned in the proposed "charter" would function better than a committee. He made reference to the fact that computer security problems can be handled in the Working Group environment in a manner similar to other security problems which have been and are being addressed under Security Committee direction.

18. ⬚ then suggested that computer security is sufficiently complex to warrant its handling by personnel deeply experienced in computer operations and suggested that its handling should be assigned to ADP professionals in a manner similar to the assignment of communications security representatives to communications professionals. Some discussion of this comment followed. Colonel Koenig indicated his belief that this line of thinking lends support to the earlier proposal that a task force be established for handling computer security problems in which participation is equally accorded the technical, user, and security people. The Chairman stated his feeling that the problems of computer security (other than those directly involved in communication security matters, e.g., TEMPEST) are not of sufficient complexity to say that security professionals, as represented on the Security Committee, cannot cope with them. He emphasized, however, that the computer in its third generation has created a new dimension to security and that personnel resources must be developed within the separate security organizations to cope with these problems. This discussion was not pursued further, since it was considered beyond the purview of the Working Group.

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19. A second recommendation concerning the draft "charter" by AEC was that the proposed special committee maintain liaison with the Defense Science Board and the U.S. Communication Security Board.

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The Chairman commented that within the framework of the established Working Group this suggestion had been included in paragraph 5 of the redraft.

20. A third proposal received from AEC was a recommendation that computer security policies be made applicable to all Federal departments and be promulgated through an Executive Order. It was suggested that progress toward achieving resolution of problems as well as implementation of security policies relative to problem resolution would more easily be promulgated through USIB and through individual agencies. The possibility of broader adoption of such USIB established policies was recognized. On this point the Chairman stated that the Working Group as established was limited to the USIB environment and that at least initially progress would be easier at this level rather than attempting to obtain Government-wide coordination of such policy for Executive Order promulgation.

21. A fourth recommendation by AEC was that the proposed special committee submit periodic reports to USIB. In the context of the Working Group this proposal was included in paragraph 4 of the "charter," which provided that the Working Group would periodically report to the Security Committee and through IBSEC to the Board itself.

22. Following the discussion of the above noted comments on the "charter," no objection was voiced by those attending to the Chairman's proposal that it be submitted in its current form to the Chairman of the Security Committee. Members agreed that approval of this "charter" by the Security Committee will permit the Working Group to pursue its objectives.

23. IHC Annual Report: The Chairman noted to Working Group members that he had received a copy of the first annual IHC report (USIB-71.6/1 dated 9 September 1968). He commended this report to members' attention and suggested that they obtain copies from their individual IHC members.

24. Problem Area Identification: The Chairman announced that he had received submissions from most Working Group member agencies concerning the identification of problem areas in the computer security environment. He requested the Department of State representative to

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provide a submission in this regard as soon as possible; Mr. Kitterman indicated that the report was in the process of preparation. The Chairman also suggested the possibility of the FBI representative's making a submission in this regard.

25. Preliminary work has been done towards analyzing the problem areas of the various agencies with a view towards preparing the consolidated report for the Security Committee. The Chairman pointed out that while the "charter" outlines assigned responsibilities and projected goals of the Working Group, a paper consolidating the problem areas identified in the community will serve as a list of specific tasks facing the Group.

26. With reference to the identification of these problem areas, the Chairman noted his desire to remove from Working Group consideration at least one of the problem areas, viz., the TEMPEST and other exclusively communications problems. His suggestion in this regard is based on the fact that the USCSB is already addressing this problem and has formed a working group interested in the TEMPEST problem as it pertains to computer operations. The Chairman noted the need to avoid duplication of effort as well as the competence of communications security people in the TEMPEST arena.

27. New Business:

    a. Colonel Koenig raised the question of what resources are envisioned to be made available to the Working Group. He suggested bringing to the attention of the Security Committee the need for resource allocation and tasking authority in any attempt to solve and or resolve security problems in the computer environment. He suggested the need for determining who will serve as the R&D or testing and evaluation element for the Working Group. The Chairman replied that he would bring this to the attention of the Security Committee Chairman, but that although specific resources were not currently available to the Working Group as a whole, some assistance should be possible from the R&D components of at least some of the member agencies.

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28. Agenda for Next Working Group Meeting: In view of the fact that one of the common computer security problems relates to the establishment of acceptable procedures for downgrading computer discs, the Chairman requested members to consider the following proposal with reference to the problem:

      a. That a feasibility study be initiated concerning the establishment of a refurbishing center for computer disc packs;

      b. That this refurbishing center dismantle such computer disc packs in a security controlled environment, destroy the platters of the disc pack in an appropriately secure fashion, and that the disc packs be rebuilt with new platters;

      c. That such a refurbishing center operate under the auspices of the General Services Administration (GSA) in a manner similar to the center proposed for computer tape refurbishment in 1967, or be established under the auspices of a computer disc manufacturer after appropriate bid solicitation.

The Chairman pointed out the possibility that the cost of a refurbished disc pack might be significantly less than half the cost of a new pack.

29. It is anticipated that this matter will be discussed at the next Working Group meeting.

30. No date has been set for the next Computer Security Working Group meeting; its date will be set after the 24 September Security Committee meeting.

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Chairman

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